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performs an empirical study on whether or not the South Korean cable television 
provides programming diversity in that the South Korean government 
emphasizes diversity of content and choice whenever it introduces any new 
television medium. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 i
 TABLE OF CONTENTS 
CHAPTER          PAGE
ABSTRACT ....................................................................................................... i 
LIST OF TABLES .............................................................................................iii 
CHAPTERS 
INTRODUCTION ................................................................................... 1 
A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE SOUTH KOREAN BROADCAST 
TELEVISION SYSTEM.......................................................................... 9 
 
CABLE TELEVISION IN THE UNITED STATES ................................. 12 
THE DEVELOPMENT OF CABLE TELEVISION IN SOUTH KOREA .17 
THREE ISSUES: LOCALISM, COMPETITION, AND DIVERSITY ...... 27 
Localism...................................................................................... 27 
Competition................................................................................. 28 
Diversity ...................................................................................... 31 
CONCLUSION..................................................................................... 41 
REFERENCES............................................................................................... 45 
VITA ............................................................................................................. 49 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 ii
 LIST OF TABLES 
TABLE 1 – The South Korean Cable Television Before and After 2000......... 24 
TABLE 2 – The Market Share by Top Five MSOs from 2005 to 2010 ............ 25 
TABLE 3 – Vertical and Horizontal Program Diversity in Movie Channels ..... 37 
TABLE 4 – Vertical and Horizontal Program Diversity in Drama Channels .... 39 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 iii
 1
INTRODUCTION 
 
Fifteen years have passed since South Korea launched a systematically planned 
cable television, commonly known as the General Cable Television (GCT).  
Despite the short history of the South Korean cable television, the launch of 
cable television had been the most contestable issue in relation to the South 
Korean television industry for more than a decade.  Cable television had placed 
important meanings in the South Korean television industry in the sense that the 
introduction of cable television meant the transformation of the South Korean 
television mediascape. 
The South Korean television industry had operated under the duopoly 
system of two public broadcasting companies, Koran Broadcasting System 
(KBS) and Munhwa Broadcasting Corporation (MBC), until 1991.1  In this public 
broadcast television system contest, cable television meant the privatization of 
the South Korean television industry.2  In the duopoly system, cable television 
meant that South Korea was entering the age of multichannel multimedia with 
diversity of content and increased viewer choice.  The introduction of cable 
television instigated the launch of other television businesses such as Internet 
television in 1997 and satellite broadcasting in 2001.  The launch of South 
Korean cable television also raised such issues of localism, competition, and 
                                                 
1 In South Korea, the public broadcasting system has ‘never been a public system’ (Kim, 1996, p. 
93) in that, for example, both KBS and MBC have been the state-established and state-
controlled organizations and yet they have commercial advertisement as the main source of 
earning. 
 
2 While the South Korean government prepared for five years (from 1989 to 1993) to launch a 
new cable television system, the government licensed a privately-owned broadcast television 
network, the Seoul Broadcasting System (SBS) in 1991, planned to license four local private 
broadcast television stations in 1993, and finally permitted five privately-owned local broadcast 
television stations to operate in five big cities respectively in 1995. 
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diversity almost for the first time.  All the aspects above indicate that cable 
television played an important role in changing the South Korean television 
media environment, changing both television policies and structures of the South 
Korean television industry. 
The purpose of this research paper is to discuss the developmental 
process of South Korean cable television in relation to the structural changes of 
cable television industry, along with the changing governmental policies, and 
then to discuss issues of localism, competition, and diversity.  When South 
Korean cable system was established in the early 1960s, it was modeled on the 
U.S. Community Antenna TV (CATV) cable television system.  On the one hand, 
therefore, the South Korean cable television has developed similarly to the U.S. 
cable television system, but the former has also developed differently from the 
latter on the other hand.  At this point, the research paper will discuss the U.S. 
cable television system to provide a better understanding of South Korean cable 
television through comparisons between both countries’ cable systems. 
The South Korean cable system had operated in order to transmit mostly 
the air-wave radio signals to rural area, but not the air-wave television signals, 
until the late 1970s.  Since the early 1980s when the transmission and 
retransmission of broadcast signals started to expand to television programs 
through the cable networks built for radio signal transmission, cable television 
had long been considered a profitable and promising business in South Korea.  
Accordingly, the South Korean government launched a new cable television 
system, the General Cable Television (GCT), on March 1995.  After a couple of 
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years later, however, the newly introduced cable television system appeared to 
be a big failure due to the cumulative deficit to both the government and private 
entrepreneurs unlike their expectation.  One scholar metaphorically criticized the 
failure of GCT as degradation of cable television from the goose that lays a 
golden egg to the ugly duckling that would never be transformed to a swan 
(Hwang, 2001).  Many critics found the reason for the failure to stabilize the GCT 
in the South Korean government’s lack of proper policies toward cable television 
and recognition cable television as an industry. 
The reason why the South Korean government failed to stabilize the new 
cable television system in the initial phase emerged from two aspects in terms of 
policy-making.  First, even though there had already been an established cable 
system known as the Relay Cable Television (RCT) under an established law, 
the South Korean government set up a new law along with a new cable television 
system GCT, leaving the existing cable television system RCT intact.  As a result, 
there had been two cable television systems operating under two different law 
and two different regulatory bodies, competing in a single cable television market. 
Second, initial regulation incorporated cable television service into the 
existing broadcast television structure without ruining the existing structure (Kwak, 
2007).  In other words, the South Korean government did not want cable 
television to erode the public broadcast television system even though the 
government permitted private sectors to jump into cable television business (Lee 
& Joe, 2000).  One way to protect the public broadcast television system was to 
prohibit any privately-owned cable television company from becoming a big 
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television conglomerate.  As a result, the South Korean government did not allow 
horizontal ownership and vertical ownership in the new cable television system 
and the government allotted networks to the state-owned companies. 
The second factor was possible because of the South Korean 
government’s long-term perception of television as the political means rather 
than economic and industrial entity (Hwang, 2001).  The South Korean 
government started to recognize television as similar to other industries after the 
government confronted failure, criticism, and even economic crisis of 1997.  At 
that point, the government began to deregulate in 1998 the ownership limits in 
South Korean cable television system by amending the General Cable Television 
Law.  The government in the end abolished the General Cable Television Law 
and the Cable TV Administration Law and in 2000, which had regulated the GCT 
and the RCT respectively and had been considered accordingly as the barrier to 
the stabilization of GCT.  The government integrated them into an amended 
Broadcast Law in 2000 and started to control the current cable television system 
under the law.  Since the early 2000s, South Korean cable television has been 
flourishing, growing to 15 million subscribers and a penetration rate of nearly 
80% in 2010 (Korea Cable Television Association, 2010).  Cable television in 
South Korea becomes an important means to watch television today.3
The South Korean cable television has clearly been stabilized as a 
television industry and seems to be successful in business currently.  However, 
the stabilization as an industry and the success in business are different stories.  
                                                 
3 According to a research (Korean Broadcasting Commission, 2005), television becomes the 
most dominant medium used by 89.8% of Koreans.  And, 68.5% of those television users have 
cable television installed at home, and the proportion is still increasing. 
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The South Korean cable television has confronted other television business 
competitors in a limited domestic television market since the early 2000s.  For 
example, the South Korean government permitted Direct Broadcast Satellite 
(DBS) based on the rationale that increasing media and channels would provide 
television viewers with what they really want to view resulting from diverse 
competing television services (Hwang, 2001).  DBS has been expected to stop 
cable television’s victory by “aggressively pursuing current cable customers for 
services” (Carlin, 2000, p. 50), bringing the competition in the fee-charging 
broadcasting market (Ha, 2004).  Indeed, the DBS subscribers have continued 
increasing since DBS was introduced in the South Korean television market.  
Accordingly, the story of whether or not cable television keeps thriving in the 
South Korean television market is not over. 
In accordance with newly emerging television service providers such as 
mobile television, Direct Broadcast Satellite (DBS), Satellite Digital Multimedia 
Broadcasting (SDMB), Terrestrial Digital Multimedia Broadcasting (TDMB), the 
internet-based multi-channel broadcast services (IPTV), and mobile broadcast 
service through broadband wireless Internet (Wibro), scholars’ concerns about 
cable television have lessened as many scholars have turned their interests over 
to new television media.  This research paper mentioned earlier that South 
Korean cable television has important meanings in terms of the transformation of 
television mediascape in South Korea.  Before the introduction of new cable 
television system, there had been few debates over the issues such as localism, 
competition, and diversity, and the television laws and policies had rarely been 
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discussed in depth in South Korea;  rather, full discussion of all those subjects 
above occurred after the introduction of GCT.  Furthermore, the policies toward 
the newly emerging television media mentioned above are mostly established on 
the basis of the Broadcast Law of 2000 that was born through the 10-year’s trial 
and error of cable television carry-out.  Therefore, we can hardly catch the 
meaningful aspects of new television media industries in the contemporary South 
Korean television mediascape without understanding the developmental process 
of the South Korean cable television.  So much so that, it is timely for a study to 
revisit the South Korean cable television for better understandings of overall 
television industry in South Korea. 
The South Korean cable system was modeled on the U.S. cable television 
system when the South Korean cable radio system in 1961 – cable television 
system later in the late 1970s and early 1980s – was established.  Therefore, 
there are many similarities between the two cable television systems though 
there are also some significant differences between the two systems.  One major 
difference between the two systems is that cable television in South Korea has 
been developed in accordance with the government’s political interest unlike the 
U.S. cable television system which emerged from consumer’s demand.  In other 
word, while the U.S. cable system evolved from the necessity of business 
expansion by relaying over-the-air television signals to fringe areas, the South 
Korean cable system evolved from the necessity of political justification and 
propaganda of the Park Chung-hee’s military government (1961 – 1979) by 
transmitting over-the-air radio signals to fringe areas.  The initial phase of the 
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South Korean cable television during the late 1970s and the early 1980s is 
almost similar to the U.S. cable television of the 1950s and 1960s in terms of the 
business practice, which was the relay of over-the-air television broadcast 
signals.  In addition, the South Korean cable television has undergone the exact 
same process as the U.S. cable television since the deregulation of ownerships 
in cable television began in the late 1990s; that is, the concentration of 
ownerships in a few big conglomerates. 
After the discussion of the developmental process of the cable television 
of both South Korean and the United States, this research paper will discuss the 
issues relating to cable television: localism, competition, and diversity.  The 
South Korean government’s basic agenda to introduce cable television has been 
to provide the South Korean television viewers with diversity of content and 
channel choice.  In addition, the diversity agenda has always been included in 
the government’s justification whenever it establishes any new television service 
provider.  Thus, I will focus more heavily on the diversity issue rather than on 
localism and competition.  There are four types of diversity: viewpoint diversity, 
outlet diversity, source diversity, and program diversity (FCC, 2002; Kunz, 2007).  
Following the South Korean government’s justification, the research paper will 
describe an empirical study on program diversity among four types of diversity in 
order to reveal whether or not the South Korean cable television provides 
diversity of content for television viewers. 
The introduction of a new cable television system GCT was a major 
turning point in the whole South Korean television industry.  At this point, a brief 
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history of South Korean television system is in order before discussing cable 
television more specifically.  This will give a clearer understanding of how the 
South Korean television mediascape started to be transformed in accordance 
with the introduction of a new cable television system. 
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A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE SOUTH KOREAN 
BROADCAST TELEVISION SYSTEM 
The very first broadcast television in South Korea appeared as a privately-owned 
commercial television station, HLKZ-TV.  It was launched on March 12, 1956 by 
KORCAD, which was the South Korean branch of the American television 
manufacturing company RCA, for the purpose of promoting sales of television 
sets in South Korea.  It aired television programs two hours a day.  Shortly after, 
on March 6, 1957, however, RCA turned the station over to a South Korean daily 
newspaper Hankook Ilbo due to deficit operation.  Hankook Ilbo operated the 
station under Daehan Broadcasting Company (DBC).  But, the station was wholly 
destroyed by fire in 1959 and DBC stopped its broadcast television business in 
1961. 
Soon after the DBC’s stopping its service, Park Chung-hee’s military 
government (1961 – 1979) established a state-owned television station, KBS-TV, 
on December 31, 1961 and started to air its programs in 1962.  Later, Park’s 
government allowed two privately-owned commercial television stations: 
Tongyang Broadcasting Company (TBC) on December 7, 1964, and Munhwa 
Broadcasting Corporation (MBC) on August 8, 1969.  Under the guise of 
promotion of just and fair television culture, the Park’s military government 
established the Korean Broadcasting Corporation Law in 1970.  The Park 
government launched in 1973 a public broadcasting corporation and seemingly 
transformed the state-operated television station to public television station 
operated by the public broadcasting corporation, which was owned and 
controlled by the Park government. Even though Park created a public 
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broadcasting system and permitted the privately-own television stations, they had 
been thoroughly controlled by Park government’s political interest until he died in 
1979: 
 
Television was seen as an important instrument to consolidate 
national identity, security and development, as well as to provide 
support for Park’s dictatorship during its 18-year regime through the 
imposition of severe censorship over content (Lee & Joe, 2000, p. 
133). 
 
In 1980, South Korea entered the second military regime after Chun Doo-hwan 
seized power through his military coup.  One of Chun’s primary imperatives 
shortly after his coup was to reform the contemporary media systems in South 
Korea.  At the end of the 1980, the Chun’s military government established the 
Prime Press Law, by which private ownership of broadcasting media was 
completely prohibited.  Except MBC for television and a religious station Christian 
Broadcasting System (CBS) for radio, all radio and television stations were 
integrated into the Korean Broadcasting System (KBS).  Since then until 1990, 
the South Korean over-the-air broadcasting systems have operated under public 
management.  However, it is hard to say that the two networks are purely public 
when we look at the main sources of revenue of two public broadcast networks, 
KBS and MBC.  KBS’s main sources of revenue have been license fees and 
advertising while MBC’s main source has been advertising.  Furthermore, all 
advertising for both networks was controlled by Korean Broadcasting Advertising 
Corporation (KOBACO), which was a governmental institution.  In these senses, 
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public broadcast television in South Korea seemed to be closer to a state-
controlled duopoly system of KBS and MBC. 
In the 1960s and 1970s, television system in South Korea had operated 
under the coexisting system of public and commercial broadcast television.  
During the 1980s, South Korean broadcast television had operated in the 
duopolized public system.  However, the duopoly system of public broadcasters 
started to change in the late 1980s when the South Korean civil government 
decided to allow private ownership in cable television and local broadcast 
television stations.  Since private ownership was allowed in cable television, the 
South Korean television industry has transformed dramatically along the 
controversial shifts of policies toward cable television several times. 
In the next two parts of the paper, this research paper will examine the 
development of cable television systems in terms of policies and industrial 
structure.  The paper will first discuss the U.S. cable television system in relation 
to the American policies and industrial structures in that the South Korean cable 
system was modeled after the U.S. cable system.  Then, the paper will secondly 
discuss the South Korean cable system with regard to the policies and industrial 
structures.  This comparison will provide a better understanding of the South 
Korean cable television system. 
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CABLE TELEVISION IN THE UNITED STATES 
U.S. cable television emerged in the late 1940s.  The purpose of cable television 
was to enhance and provide the broadcast television signals reception in fringe 
areas such as rural and mountainous communities where it was hard for the 
television users to view the over-the-air television programs with the conventional 
television antenna.  It was adopted in a small scale using the shared 
noncommercial community antenna television services (CATV).  However, the 
development was slow and intensively local until the late 1950s (Parsons, 2008) 
because CATV was considered to be “simply a local retransmission service” of 
broadcast television signals (Crandall & Furchtogot-Roth, 1996, p. 2).4 Because 
of this retransmission function, CATV had not been considered as a threat to the 
broadcast television industry by both the Federal Communications Commission 
(FCC) and broadcast television entrepreneurs in the 1950s (Crandall & 
Furchtogot-Roth, 1996) even though the first subscription cable television system 
was established in Lansford, Pennsylvania in 1950. 
The U.S. CATV industry began to grow more rapidly after several CATV 
operators were able to deliver broadcast signals hundreds of miles away by 
using microwave in the late 1950s (Gomery, 2000; Mullen, 2008).  Local 
broadcasters considered the distant retransmission of broadcast signals as a 
threat to their businesses and they forced the FCC to restrict the CATV 
operators’ importation of distant television signals.  Then, the FCC started 
regulating the U.S. cable industry in order to protect local broadcast stations, and 
                                                 
4 This ‘retransmission service’ had been accepted as a major function of cable television until the 
late 1970s (Mullen, 2008). 
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the FCC’s regulation of the U.S. cable industry continued mostly for two decades 
of the 1960s and the 1970s until the Commission abandoned most of restrictions 
by 1980 (Crandall & Furchtgott-Roth, 1996). 
In 1962, the FCC established a rule that CATV should carry local signals 
but not distant signals that duplicated the local stations.  The FCC’s regulation 
slowed the development of the U.S. cable industry during the 1960s (Albarran, 
2002; Gomery, 2000).  Nevertheless, several large corporations already started 
to become multiple system operators (MSO) in the early 1960, creating regional 
consolidation of ownership through buy-out of the small systems. 
The period of 1968-1974 was characterized by three rules: 1) anti-
leapfrogging rule; 2) syndicated exclusivity rule; and 3) public access rule.  Under 
anti-leapfrogging rule, cable systems should carry all local broadcast signals and 
they were allowed to import the distant signals.  Under the syndicated exclusivity 
provisions, however, any cable system was not able to show “a program via the 
transmission of a distant station it carried if a local station held exclusive rights to 
the program in that particular market” (Mullen, 2008, p. 100).  With the public 
access rule, the FCC regulated that cable systems that had over 3,500 
subscribers should set aside non-commercial cable channels for public, 
educational, and governmental programming, commonly know as PEG, and 
cable systems in the top 100 markets had to provide four public access channels 
for members of the community. 
However, the FCC had abandoned “most of restrictions on how many and 
what kind of signals cable companies could carry” by 1980 (Crandall & 
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Furchtgott-Roth, 1996, p. 4) since the Commission viewed the U.S. cable 
television as a competitor rather than a harm to the U.S. broadcasters by 
concluding that “the public stood to gain more than television broadcasters stood 
to lose” (Brainard, 2004, p. 63).  The FCC eliminated the public access rule in 
1974, permitted to import unlimited distant signals in 1976, and lifted the 
syndicated exclusivity provisions in 1980.  The only restriction remaining by 1980 
was the 1975 sport-related blockout rule. 
The FCC’s lifting of the syndicated exclusivity provisions made 
programming more available for cable operators and brought increasing number 
of subscribers.  However, local authorities regulated still subscription rates to 
protect local broadcast television stations.  Accordingly, the U.S. cable television 
industry lobbied to eliminate municipal service requirements and regulation of 
rate, and the U.S. Congress responded to the U.S. cable television industry to 
remove the stranglehold of municipal rate by passing the Cable Communications 
Policy Act of 1984 (Crandall & Furchtgott-Roth, 1996).5  In 1992, however, the 
U.S. Congress passed the Cable Television Consumer Protection and 
Competition Act, and the law re-imposed both municipal and federal rate 
regulations.  In the Telecommunication Act of 1996, the U.S. Congress removed 
federal rate regulation but left the rate regulation to the local municipalities as 
being negotiable for basic services.  To summarize, the U.S. cable television 
industry has operated as the most unregulated entity since 1980, no matter how 
                                                 
5 In addition, the Cable Act of 1984 prohibited the broadcast networks from owning cable systems 
and telephone companies from owning the systems within their service regions (Crandall & 
Furchtgott-Roth, 1996). 
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laws and policies toward the cable industry had been changed in the United 
States. 
The U.S. cable television industry has basically operated under a 
monopoly structure.  The U.S. cable television industry evolved from locally 
owned franchises: “the core of the cable television operation, where the 
programming meets its customers, is the basic local franchise” (Gomery, 2000, p. 
253).  Through the franchising process on a competitive bid basis, one cable 
operator gains a franchise from the local franchising authority – the operator 
tends repetitively to gain a franchise on the renewal basis.  This franchise system 
creates a monopoly structure of the cable industry at local level, meaning that “if 
a household wanted to subscribe to cable TV, it had only one choice of supplier” 
(Albarran, 2002, p. 87).  Under this monopoly structure of the U.S. cable industry, 
ownership has become more concentrated through horizontal and vertical 
integration in the industry.  Corporations typically collect franchises under one 
corporate umbrella to increase their profits, creating multiple system operators 
respectively (Gomery, 2000).  The corporations attempt to reduce the risk in 
obtaining programs through vertical integration between program production and 
cable distribution.  As a result, Megan Mullen (2008) explains: 
 
Today, two corporations, Time Warner and Comcast, control the 
vast majority of local cable systems in the United States. 
Additionally, cable MSOs have tended to be owned by other media 
or telecommunications conglomerates, thereby contributing to and 
benefiting from the synergy generated within those corporations. (p. 
19) 
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Cable television is basically the “television for a fee” (Parsons, 2008, p. 109).  
The subscribers pay for their cable television installation on monthly basis.  Thus, 
the number of subscriber influences the cable system’s revenues.  The cable 
industry continues to grow in terms of subscriber penetration to the extent that 
nearly 75 million U.S. households subscribe cable networks services – 
approximately 70 % of total U.S. television households (Blumenthal & 
Goodenough, 2006).  Along the increasing subscribers, the cable industry uses 
multi-layered markets for financing, such as basic service, premium service, pay 
service, advertising, pay-per-view, equipment rental, installation fee, cable 
modem, and the like.  Among them, the most lucrative market is basic cable 
television service, accounting for nearly 60 % of total industry revenues in 2009 
(National Cable & Telecommunications Association, 2010). 
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THE DEVELOPMENT OF CABLE TELEVISION IN SOUTH KOREA 
The major function of South Korean cable television was the same as U.S. cable 
television which was developed in order to help “the transmission of over-the-air 
television in order to serve those who could not receive local broadcast signals” 
(Pacey, 1985, p. 81).  Unlike the U.S. cable system starting from transmission of 
television signals, the South Korean cable system was adopted to deliver the air-
wave radio signal to rural areas that had poor reception of radio signals in the 
early 1960s.  However, the adaptation of cable system in South Korea rooted in 
political interest rather than media expansion imperatives.  Right after Park 
Chung-hee seized power in a military coup in 1961, the military government 
eagerly promoted the cable radio broadcast in order to justify his military coup 
nationwide and to propagandize the Park government’s political agendas later on.  
Accordingly, the government established the Amp Town Project6 by enacting the 
Administration Law of Cable Broadcast Transmission and Reception on 
September, 1961.  Following the project, the government began to construct the 
cable networks to the fringe areas in South Korea for the radio signal reception 
and to supply the radio sets, amplifiers, and loud speakers for rural areas.  Later 
in the 1970s and 1980s, the cable networks for radio signal transmission started 
to be used to transmit the over-the-air television signals after the South Korean 
military government established a state-owned television station.  However, the 
                                                 
6 With regard to the Amp Town system, basic concept is almost the same as the early CATV in 
the United States.  What difference is to connect a cable to a shared loud speaker with an 
amplifier, instead connecting the cable to a shared community television antenna as in case of 
the CATV. 
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South Korean cable television had developed in a small scale limited to a few 
urban areas until the early 1980s. 
Similar to the U.S. cable television system, the initial cable television 
system in South Korea functioned to retransmit broadcast signals.  After cable 
television expanded to the rural communities which had poor signal reception, 
another important function had been added to retransmission, which was to relay 
the broadcast signals at the same time as the over-the-air television stations 
televise their signals (Nam, 2008).  At this point, the early South Korean cable 
television system had long been characterized the so-called Relay Cable 
Television system (RCT) and operated under this system.  In this system, a relay 
operator (RO) is able to transmit broadcast television programs permitted by 
Ministry of Information and Communication at the same time as the relay 
operator directly receives the programs from over-the-air television stations or to 
retransmit them later. 
To promote the RCT, the South Korean government formed a scheme for 
cable television in 1982 as a part of the Fifth Economic Development Plan (Lee & 
Joe, 2000).  However, the RCT had still limited to certain areas until 1986.  Since 
the establishment of the CATV Law in 1986 under which the South Korean 
government granted the license for the legally registered relay operators to open 
for their business in urban areas, the RCT had spread nationwide.  However, the 
law brought up not only the legal relay operators but also illegal relay operators 
who considered the cable television as a profitable and promising business, 
resulting in competition between legal relay operators and illegal relay operators 
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in the South Korean cable television industry.  As a result, both legal and illegal 
relay operators focused on their business to transmit widely low quality video 
programs in order to have more subscribers rather than relaying the broadcast 
signals.  From then on, the South Korean cable television started to be “no longer 
simply a system for re-transmission of broadcast signals” (Calabrese & Wasko, 
1992, p. 123) at some points.  To resolve the problem, revising the CATV Law of 
1986, the South Korean National Assembly established the Cable TV 
Administration Law in 1987 which limited the programs on the cable television to 
the over-the-air broadcasting signals and public information (Lee & Joe, 2000). 
Since 1986, the RCT had been perceived as one of the most promising 
and profitable businesses in South Korea.  Nevertheless, the South Korean cable 
television industry had not developed as well as people had expected due to its 
small-scale business with regard to the RCT.  Accordingly, demands for creation 
of a new cable television system had been continuously raised from the diverse 
cable television related sectors such as academia, industry, governmental 
institutional, etc., along with the public’s demand for multichannel television 
environment.  At this point, a presidential candidate, Roh Tae-woo, set up the 
cable television issue as one of his campaign pledges. 
After Roh Tae-woo became the President of South Korea, the nature of 
South Korean cable television industry dramatically changed from a small scale 
RCT business to a new big cable industry.  The South Korean government 
decided to establish a new cable television system and launched a working 
group in 1989, the Broadcasting System Research Commission, in order to 
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investigate the problems and possibilities of the new system before it was 
introduced.  After the group’s test-run to 10,000 households, the South Korean 
government decided to launch a new cable television industry, which was called 
the General Cable Television (GCT), in six big cities on March 21, 1995, 
established the General Cable Television Law on December 31, 1991, and 
selected 53 system operators and 21 program providers.  Then, by revising the 
General Cable Television Law in 1993, the South Korean government reselected 
116 system operators and 20 program providers for 11 programming fields such 
as news, movies, sports, culture, entertainment, education, music, children, 
women, transportation and tourism, and religion (Kim, 1996).7  Later on in 1997, 
the South Korean government expanded the GCT services from six big cities to 
small cities and rural areas and permitted an additional 24 system operators. 
When the South Korean government introduced the GCT and composed a 
law regarding the GCT, its primary concern was that the existing public 
broadcasting system should not to be eroded by privately operated large media 
corporations (Lee & Joe, 2000).  In the General Cable Television Law of 1993, 
therefore, the South Korean government strictly regulated the GCT through 
ownership restriction.8  The law prohibited the industry from being horizontally 
and vertically integrated.  In addition, the government assigned two state-owned 
                                                 
7 Among the 20 programming fields, however, the potentially expected profitable fields, such as 
movie, sports, drama, and entertainment, were allocated to chaebols, which refers to the South 
Korean family-controlled conglomerates (Kim, 1996; Shim, 2002). 
 
8 Article 4 of the Cable TV Law of 1993 says: 
• Cross-ownership between and among system operator (SO), programming provider (PP), 
and network operator (NO) is not allowed, except for the government invested companies 
and public institutions 
• Multiple-ownership of more than one operating system is not allowed, to avoid 
horizontal concentration 
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corporations as network operators, which is technically the most crucial part in 
cable television industry.  As a result, any big media corporation was not able to 
be formed in South Korea in the initial phase of GCT. 
Despite the investment of tremendous national budget and private funds 
to the GCT, expecting high economic profit both for the country and for the 
entrepreneurs, the GCT appeared as a fiasco due to the large cumulative deficit 
for three years resulting from strict regulation and economic crisis in 1997.  In 
response to the big failure, the South Korean government started to deregulate 
the industry (Kwak, 2007; Lee & Joe, 2000).  The government amended the 
General Cable Television Law in 1998.  The most significant aspect of the 
amended cable television law was the deregulation of ownership.  The law 
allowed cross-ownership between system operators, program providers, and 
network operators.  Two years later in January, 2000, the government 
established an amended Broadcast Law, integrating all cable television 
regulatory rules into the law by abolishing the General Cable Television Law 
toward the GCT and the Cable TV Administration Law toward the RCT. 
From the beginning of the GCT, the South Korean cable television market 
had been uniquely structured in two aspects: 1) three separate business areas of 
System Operator (SO), Program Provider (PP), and Network Operator (NO); and 
2) coexistence of the RCT and the GCT.  The first structure comes from dividing 
the SO and the NO.  Network is a technically critical domain not only for cable 
television but also for all other media in terms of providing content service.9  
                                                 
9 In this research paper, network refers to the cable line or lines which cable television uses to 
transmit programs. 
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However, the separation of the SO from the NO in business practices made it 
hard for a SO to provide channels, which is the fundamental role of the SO, in the 
sense that the SO rests too much on an NO’s interest when the SO does not 
have its own network.10  For instance, two state-owned NOs, the Korean 
Telecom Corporation (KT) and the Korean Electric Power Corporation (KEPCO), 
which had controlled the whole cable networks in South Korea,  stopped 
investing in cable network construction after the economic crisis of 1997, and 
these NOs’ decision made it for many SOs to retrieve their business from the 
South Korean cable television industry because the SOs was not able to obtain 
enough cable networks to acquire enough subscribers to survive (Hwang, 2001; 
Lee, Kim, & Koh, 1999). 
The second structure of South Korean cable television industry had been 
characterized by its dualistic structure: 1) the preexisting small cable television 
RCT; and 2) a newly emerging big cable television GCT.  This situation 
happened because the South Korean government excluded the locally based 
relay operators of the preexisting RCT when selecting the system operators for 
the GCT.  As a result, two similar industries coexisted within the same cable 
television market, regulated by different regulation laws and different regulatory 
bodies; that is, the Ministry of Culture & Tourism regulated the SOs and PPs 
under GCT system with the General Cable Television Law and the Ministry of 
Information & Communications regulated the NOs under GCT system and the 
ROs under RCT system with the Cable TV Administration Law.  The coexistence 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
10 The dispossession of a SO’s own network caused also the disadvantage in subscriber 
gathering competition against a RO which had its own network. 
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of the GCT and the RCT, competing with each other for subscribers, meant that 
SOs had difficulty obtaining enough subscribers for their survival whereas ROs 
had already secured SOs’ potential subscribers.  In other words, SOs struggled 
to acquire subscribers while the local ROs were increasing their subscriber 
numbers (Lee, Kim, & Koh, 1999).  The coexistence of two cable television 
systems in the same market would not be problematic to the entrepreneurs if the 
merges and acquisitions were allowed between ROs and SOs.  However, 
separate laws administered by different regulatory bodies of the Ministry of 
Information & Communication to the ROs and the Ministry of Culture & Tourism 
to SOs made the activities impossible.  Consequently, the exclusion of the ROs 
when launching the GCT was considered as the fundamental reason that the 
South Korean cable television industry had failed to advance toward a profitable 
sector in the overall broadcasting marketplace (Kwon & Oh, 2005). 
Based on continuous critiques and suggestions from diverse players from 
the economic, the politic, and the public, the government started examining the 
laws thoroughly in attempts to resolve the problems.  In the end, on December 
28, 1999, the Korean Congress passed an amended Broadcast Law which 
included the General Cable Television Law and the Cable TV Administration Law 
and decided to enforce the Broadcast Law of 2000 by abolishing the two 
separate cable TV laws of RCT and GCT in January, 2000.  Not only did the 
amended Broadcast Law make it possible for a RO to transform into a SO, but it 
also allowed mergers and acquisitions among SOs and between ROs and SOs.  
Consequently, 5.7 million households were estimated to turn into the SO 
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subscribers by 2004 since the ROs were allowed to transform themselves to the 
SOs.  Even though the South Korean government permitted a RO to be 
transformed to a SO, the dualistic structure of the South Korean cable television 
industry is still alive in a small scale. 
 
TABLE 1 – The South Korean Cable Television Before and After 2000 
 Before After 
Cable 
System 
RCT GCT GCT 
 
Law 
Cable TV Administration 
Law of 1987 
General Cable Television 
Law of 1993 
Broadcast Law of 
2000 
 
 
Regulatory 
Body 
 
 
Ministry of Information & 
Communication 
 
- SO: Ministry of Culture & 
Tourism 
- PP: Ministry of Culture & 
Tourism 
- NO: Ministry of Information 
& Communication 
 
 
Korea Broadcasting 
Commission 
Industrial 
Structure 
Separated or Combined 
business of RO and NO 
Separated business of SO, 
PP, and NO 
Separated or 
Combined business 
of SO, PP, and NO  
Programs 
Transmission 
Retransmission of 
the over-the-air television 
- Transmission of programs provided by PP. 
- Retransmission of the over-the-air television and 
DBS programs 
Monthly Fee $3 to $4 $17 Wide range 
 
 
The most significant aspect in the Broadcast Law of 2000 was deregulation of 
ownership.  The law allowed multiple-ownership, which led to creation of the 
multiple system operator (MSO) and multiple programming provider (MPP).  
Consequently, nine MSOs were formed by 2005, which held 70 % of the whole 
South Korean SO market (Youn & Kim, 2006).  Among the nine MSOs, top five 
MSOs held 56.2% of the market in 2005 and they take currently 70.3 % of market 
share in March, 2010 (Table 2).  The law allowed also cross-ownership between 
SO, PP, and NO, which led to creation of the multiple system operator and 
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programming provider (MSP) and the multiple system and network operator 
(MSNO).  As a result, for example, four MSPs were formed by 2004 (Kwak, 
2007). 
 
TABLE 2 – The Market Shares by Top Five MSOs from 2005 to 2010 
MSO 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
# of SOs 16 16 15 15 15 15  
C&M Subscribers 1,556 1,905 2,028 2,081 2,153 2,154 
# of SOs 8 10 13 14 14 14  
CJ Subscribers 1,244 1,516 2,132 2,556 2,514 2,531 
# of SOs 12 12 12 12 12 10  
CMB Subscribers 910 1,139 1,197 1,216 1,237 1,296 
# of SOs 8 10 11 11 10 8  
HCN Subscribers 859 1,029 1,141 1,198 1,182 1,348 
# of SOs 21 20 18 15 15 21  
Tbroad Subscribers 2,746 2,938 2,666 2,759 2,857 3,396 
Top 5’s Subscribers 7,315 8,527 9,164 9,810 9,943 10,725 
Total Subscribers 13,026 14,031 14,215 14,866 15,260 15,265 
Total Households 17,390 17,858 18,327 18,787 19,247 19,707 
Top 5’s market share rate 
(Top 5’s Subs/Total Subs) 
56.2% 60.8% 64.5% 66.0% 65.2% 70.3% 
Penetration rate 
(Total Subs/Total HS) 
74.9% 78.6% 77.6% 79.1% 79.3% 77.5% 
Source: the Korea Cable Television Association 
* Unit for subscribers: thousand 
 
 
The law also allowed chaebols11 and foreign companies to hold up to 33 % of 
shares in cable operation companies, which was previously prohibited, and the 
law increased the rate up to 49 % in 2004.  The Broadcast Law of 2000 changed 
the license system of PP to the registration system.  As a result, big television 
companies with the large amount of capital and the powerful know-how of 
                                                 
11 A chaebol refers to a South Korean family-controlled conglomerate. 
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production were able to enter into commercial channels such as sport, 
entertainment, and drama.  The entrance of big media companies into PPs and 
MPPs and the entrance of chaebols and big foreign funds to SOs and MSOs are 
viewed as the signs of monopoly and oligopoly in the South Korean cable 
television industry, which indicates that “cable television … control over 
increasingly concentrated supplies of cable programming rests in [big] private 
hands” (Calabress & Wasko, 1992, p. 121). 
Since 1995 when the GCT started, the market of the South Korean cable 
television industry has steadily grown.  In 2010, South Korea has 15.3 million 
cable households out of 19.7 million total households nationwide, which is 
approximately 78% of households (Table 2).  In this large subscriber market, the 
financing of the South Korean cable television industry is exactly the same as in 
the U.S cable industry: subscription fees, by service tier, pay services including 
pay-per-view, equipment rentals (boxes and modems), installation fees, and 
revenues from advertising.  However, the South Korean cable industry was rarely 
profitable despite the rapid market growth until the early 2000s.  For example, the 
SOs recorded a $50 million deficit in 1995, a $57 million deficit in 1996, and a 
$5.7 million deficit in 2000; and the PPs recorded a $180 million deficit in 1995, a 
$240 million deficit in 1996, and a deficit of $85,000 in 2000.12
 
 
 
                                                 
12 Sources are retrieved from the Korean Broadcasting Institute (2000), the Korea Information 
Society Development Institute (2000), and the Korea Broadcasting Commission (2000; 2003). 
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THREE ISSUES: LOCALISM, COMPETITION, AND DIVERSITY 
 
Localism 
Historically, the U.S. Federal Communication Commission has emphasized 
localism, holding that the best broadcast practice is locally generated and 
operated (Gomery, 2000).  This idea of localism with regard to broadcast 
television has also been applied to the U.S. cable television industry.  Thus, the 
cable television policies in the United States have evolved to balance localism 
(Calabrese & Wasko, 1992).  To regulate the cable industry in the early 
development stage during 1950s and 1960s was to protect local broadcast 
stations, which were considered a primary resource for representing local 
communities.  To regulate the industry to carry locally originated programming 
was to promote local communities and identities.  Deregulation in the Cable Act 
of 1984 based on the FCC’s concept of ‘effective competition’ was also to 
encourage localism through competition between local cable television and local 
broadcast television.  However, the deregulation promoted the ownership 
concentration in terms of programming recruiting and diverted the concerns of 
cable television industry away from localism as Calabrese and Wasko (1992) 
argue: 
 
In the process of its evolution, cable industry leaders have made 
little effort to develop a system which is responsive to the spirit of 
localism which was present in the early visions of cable, nor have 
they been responsive to independent programmers. In fact, there is 
hostility by dominant players in the cable industry to sources of 
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television programming which are not commercially controlled by 
the increasingly concentrated cable cartel. (p.123) 
 
In terms of the South Korean television industry as a whole, there had been not a 
similar concept of localism.  When the South Korean government introduced 
cable radio and CATV in the early 1960s, it was not because of localism but 
because of the political goals of justifying the military coup and the government’s 
economic development.  Several scholars (see Youn & Kim, 2006) argue that the 
introduction of the GCT in the early 1990s is the very beginning of localism in 
South Korean broadcasting television.  However, the decision to introduce the 
cable television system in South Korea was not to promote localism but in 
response to a public outcry against the low quality video programming on the 
RCT and to satisfy economic demands (Lee & Joe, 2000; Youn, 1999).  In 
addition, the RCT’s function was to relay the nationwide broadcast signals rather 
than to carry locally generated programs at that time.  In this sense, I would say 
that the beginning of private local commercial stations in the mid-1990s, which 
started to televise their own locally generated programs, was the advent of 
localism in South Korea.  Whether the local stations would “help to strengthen 
the local community” (Calabrese & Wasko, 1992, p. 136) is still open-ended 
question to study further. 
 
Competition 
The concentration of ownership in large media corporations is still an issue in 
both the U.S. and South Korean cable television industries.  In this situation, a 
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contestable issue is competition within the industry and between the television 
industries.  Deregulation since the Cable Act of 1984 in the United States has 
promoted rapid growth in cable television service but brought on concentration of 
ownership through vertical integration, creating MSOs.  Crandall and Furchtogott-
Roth (1996) argue that competition is not promoted under concentration 
environment by explaining that “large MSOs can prevent entry into cable 
programming because they favor their own programming and are less likely to 
purchase programming in which they have no financial interest” (p. 17).  
Furthermore, they indicate three reasons why competition has not emerged: 
 
1) Cable television systems generally required a franchise from a 
municipal government. Municipal franchising is often restrictive, 
favoring the franchisee and some constituency groups (p. 85); 2) 
some competitive situations have been ended by mergers or 
system swaps among MSOs (p. 85); and 3) a large share of an 
incumbent cable firm’s assets are sunk; therefore, the incumbent 
may lower rates substantially in the face of a competitive threat (p. 
86) 
 
In terms of the competition between the television industries under the multi-
channel and multimedia environment, however, Crandall and Furchtogot-Roth 
(1996) consider that DBS already became a competitor unlike many other 
terrestrial alternatives to cable television in 1996.  Goolsbee and Petrin (2004) 
explain that the U.S. cable television has not faced many competitors in terms of 
the entry or start-ups, but they urge us to reconsider the competition in terms of 
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alternative programming sources such as (Direct Broadcast Satellite (DBS) and 
Multichannel Multipoint Distribution Service (MMDS).  They hold that DBS is the 
only direct competitor to cable television.  Otherwise, DBS is to some degree 
expected to stop cable television’s winning in television industries by bringing up 
the competition and the direction of development in the fee-charging 
broadcasting market (Ha, 2004).  Unlike the scholars above who consider DBS 
as a competitor to cable television, however, Chan-Olmsted (1996a) argues that 
DBS does not become a competitor in the concentration structure of the U.S. 
cable television industry, which draws on monopoly or oligopoly structure.  In 
order to justify her claim, she measures the percentage of total market shares 
accounted for by the top four (CR4) and top eight (CR8) firms: 
 
The concentration ratios of the top four and top eight MSOs in early 
1995 are close to 50% and 65%, which imply a moderately 
concentrated industry structure with strong market power 
concentrated among the top four firms. If this leading MSOs’ partial 
holdings of other MOSs are included, the adjusted CR4 and CR8 
are as high as 58% and 73%, approaching a strong oligopolistic 
market structure. (Chan-Olmsted, 1996a, p. 31) 
 
These measurements tell that the higher the concentration ratios are, the more 
the economic activity is centralized under the control of only a small handful of 
firms.  In this oligopolistic market structure, she explains, the large MSOs do not 
allow the entry or start-ups from the other television industry sectors like DBS.  In 
this sense, Chan-Olmsted (1996a) claims that a structural regulation on 
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integration and concentration “is still necessary to curb MSOs and MPPs 
anticompetitive conduct” (p. 39). 
The South Korean broadcasting marketplace as a whole has been going 
through dramatic changes due to various broadcast service providers such as 
DSB, digital DMB, terrestrial DMB, IPTV, and Wibro.  South Korea is today 
clearly under multichannel and multimedia circumstance, under which the South 
Korean cable television industry seems to meet considerable competition.  In this 
multichannel and multimedia age, Hwang (2001) views that the South Korean 
cable television is not guaranteed to survive competition with other new media, 
especially, in the limited small market of Korea.  Two South Korean scholars, 
Youn and Kim (2006), examined how competition appeared between the South 
Korean television industries.  They claim that the absolute winner is the cable 
television industry because of its increasing vertical integration of programming, 
distribution, and production in the overall competition.  Their findings explain that 
the concentration structure of the South Korean cable industry hardly allows the 
entry or launch of other television industry sectors; likewise, Chan-Olmsted 
(1996a) argues the large MSOs do not allow the entry or start-ups from the other 
television industry sectors like DBS in the U.S. 
 
Diversity 
With regard to diversity, the FCC (2002) presents four types of diversity: 
viewpoint diversity, outlet diversity, source diversity, and program diversity.  
Viewpoint diversity refers to the number of media content from a variety of 
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perspectives which is available to media users, and it often relates to 
informational content relating to the welfare of the public.  Outlet diversity refers 
to a variety of independent owners who control media outlets, so it relates to how 
many independent outlets are available to media users in a given market; 
however, the currently increasing media outlets do not reflect an increase in the 
number of owners under the concentration of media outlets in a few hands.  
Source diversity refers to the availability of media content creators or producers, 
so it relates to the number of program producers from which media channels 
acquire their programs.  Program diversity refers to a variety of programs, 
formats, and content, and it is often considered to be achieved through 
competition. 
In the age of multichannel and multimedia, it is no doubt that there are 
increasing number of outlets and channels.  However, there is no guarantee that 
the variety of outlets and channels reflects true diversity in the era of 
concentration.  All four types of diversity above are closely related one another, 
and they are all satisfied in true diversity.  Among the four types of diversity, 
however, this research paper examines program diversity in relation to South 
Korean cable television in that the government’s justification of the necessity of 
multchannel and multimedia has centered on the variety of content and viewers’ 
choices. 
One major point in the cable television industry is the increase in viewing 
options in terms of the increasing number of channels provided by the rapidly 
growing industry (Kim, 1997).  In addition, a research (Korean Broadcasting 
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Commission, 2005) reveals that the diversity of channels in cable television is the 
second most important factor for viewers to choose to subscribe the cable 
television in South Korea.13  Many people seem to believe that the creation of 
new cable television channels means a new level of diversity in content or 
programming available to the television viewers (Kubey & Shifflet, 1995).  In her 
study, for example, Chan-Olmsted (1996b) argues that the increasing number of 
children’s channels in cable television industry contributes to the increasing 
diversity in children’s programming. 
The development of cable television industry in South Korea had played 
crucial roles in creating a great deal of channels.  Today, the creation of channels 
is accelerated by the South Korean cable television industry in competition within 
the industry and with other television industries.  Peterson and Berger (1975) 
indicated that a competitive market leads to diversity.  Technology and the 
marketplace idea of competition encourage “the proliferation of channels and 
new audience markets” (Iosifides, 1999, p. 160).  In other words, competition can 
increase numerical diversity; that is, competition creates more channels which 
can give people more consumer choice.  However, Iosifides (1999) argues that 
this is just theoretically possible.  He holds that the quantitative diversity in terms 
of channel variety does not actually reflect the qualitative diversity in terms of 
media content or programming.  In this sense, Park (2005) examines how 
competition under the contemporary South Korean multichannel and multimedia 
                                                 
13 36.1% of the South Korean cable television subscribers answer that they choose the cable 
television because of the number of channels; 43.6% of them answer that the most important 
factor is the higher definition of cable television than the over-the-air television (Korean 
Broadcasting Commission, 2005). 
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circumstance influences the programming diversity of top-ranking cable channels. 
She holds that competition and diversity are negatively related; “when a 
competitor enters the market, there is generally a drop in diversity” (Park, 2005, p. 
51).  In other words, she explains that the overall genre diversity on the cable 
television tends to decrease when new channels increase as a result of 
competition.  At this point, it seems true to say that the increasing numbers and 
types of channels do not necessarily reflect an increase in diversity of 
programming (Calabrese and Wasko, 1992; Kunz, 2007; etc).  However, an 
examination as to whether or not the South Korean cable television channels 
operate with the program diversity is still necessary to provide more empirical 
evidence. 
In order to examine the program diversity in the South Korean cable 
television, I performed a simple case study.  The Korean Broadcasting 
Commission (2005) reported that almost 90% of the South Korean cable 
television subscribers watched two specific types of channels the most: drama 
and movie.  According to the report, 48.8% of the subscribers watched drama 
channels the most and 40.4% of them watched movie channels the most.  
According to a South Korean viewer ratings company, ABG Nielsen Media 
Research, three drama channels and two movie channels have always been 
ranked top ten among the South Korean cable television channels in terms of 
viewer ratings in 2009 and 2010.  Therefore, I chose three drama channels (KBS 
N Drama, MBC Drama Net, and SBS Plus), and two movie channels (Channel 
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CGV and OCN).  All five channels are included when a subscriber installs a cable 
television service. 
When examining program diversity, the paper adopted two diversity 
concepts to the study: 1) vertical program diversity; and 2) horizontal program 
diversity.  Grant (1994) defines horizontal program diversity as “the number of 
program types available to viewers from all available channels at any given time” 
(p. 54) and vertical program diversity as “the number of program types offered by 
a single channel over its entire schedule” (p. 54).  In the definitions with the term, 
program types, programs are classified into one of broad categories such as 
news, comedy, drama, movie, variety, etc.  This case study has already chosen 
two specific types of programs: movie and drama.  Even though each channel 
chosen for the study operates basically with their specific program types of movie 
and drama, the two movie channels offer also a few foreign drama series and the 
three drama channels offer other entertainment programs along with drama 
series.  Therefore, redefinition of the two program diversity concepts is necessary 
for the study purpose.  Regardless of program types, accordingly, the study 
defines vertical program diversity as the number of different programs and 
episodes provided in a single channel and horizontal program diversity as the 
number of different programs and episodes between two or more similar 
channels. 
In order to examine program diversity, the study used a programming 
schedule of each channel for 100 days from January 1, 2010, to April 10, 2010, 
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retrieved from a South Korean portal website, Daum.14  Using the programming 
schedule, the study took four steps to find the numbers of programs offered by 
each channel: 1) how many programs each channel provided; 2) how many 
times each channel delivered the programs; 3) among the total number of 
delivery, how many programs were delivered once and how many programs 
were delivered twice or more; and 4) how many programs were shared by the 
two movie channels and how many programs were shared by the three drama 
channels.  The study also transformed the numbers found to proportions to better 
interpret the numbers.  By comparing the numbers and proportions, the study 
revealed whether or not there are vertical program diversity and horizontal 
program diversity in relation to the chosen channels.  The results show that the 
higher the numbers and proportions of programs that delivered once, the wider 
vertical program diversity in a single channel, and that the lower the numbers and 
proportions of programs shared by channels, the wider horizontal program 
diversity between channels. 
Table 3 reports vertical program diversity for each movie channel and 
horizontal program diversity between two movie channels along with the number 
of programs used by each movie channel, the number and proportion of each 
channel’s program transmission, and the number and proportion of programs 
shared by both channels.  Channel CGV offered 333 different movies for 100 
days with 173 of these transmitted movies once and 160 movies transmitted 
                                                 
14 There are many websites providing cable television schedule including each cable channel’s 
website, but they do not provide the past schedule; rather, they provides schedule on today or 
this week basis.   Daum is the only site that provides the past cable television schedule. For 
schedules, refer to http://movie.daum.net/tv/cable/chartTable.do?channelType=2
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twice or more.  With 333 different movie programs, Channel CGV placed 789 
slots in its programming schedule for 100 days.  A subscriber of Channel CGV 
could be exposed once to 333 different movies.  For the remaining 456 slots, 
Channel CGV filled them with the repeats of 160 movies.  OCN offered 296 
different movies for 100 days.  It transmitted 148 movies once and 148 movies 
twice or more.  OCN set up 778 slots in its 100-days programming schedule.  A 
subscriber of OCN could watch 296 different movies once.  OCN filled the 
remaining 482 slots with the repeats of 148 movies. 
 
TABLE 3 – Vertical and Horizontal Program Diversity in Movie Channels 
 Channel CGV OCN Total 
Once 173 148 321 
Twice or more 160 148 308 
 
Number of 
programs Total 333 296 629 
(100%) 
Once 333 
(42.2%) 
296 
(38.0%) 
629 
Twice or more 456 
(57.8%) 
482 
(62.0%) 
938 
 
Number of 
program 
transmission 
Total 789 
(100%) 
778 
(100%) 
1,567 (100%) 
Number of programs 3 3 
(0.004%) 
 
Shared programs 
Programs transmission 3 8 8 (0.013%) 
1. Vertical diversity: shaded cells 
2. Horizontal diversity: bold italics 
 
 
In order to revealed vertical program diversity in each movie channel, the study 
examined the proportions of one-time transmission of movie channels 
respectively.  Channel CGV consisted of 42.2% one-time transmission out of the 
total 789 offerings (Table 3).  With 42.2% of one-time transmission, the study 
found that Channel CGV provided programs in .422 degree of vertical program 
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diversity.  OCN made up 38.0% one-time transmission out of the total 778 
offerings (Table 3).  With 38.0% of one-time transmission, the study found that 
OCN provided programs in .380 degree of vertical program diversity in OCN.  
Comparing the two vertical program diversity degrees, Channel CGV presented 
slightly wider vertical program diversity than OCN did.  Out of 629 different 
movies from Channel CGV and OCN all together, there were three movies 
shared by both movie channels.  The proportion of shared programs marked 
0.004%, which could be said almost Zero.  At this point, two movie channels 
operated in approximately 1.0 degree of horizontal program diversity. 
With regard to the drama channels, the study used a different approach to 
examine vertical program diversity and horizontal program diversity.  According 
to the programming schedules for 100 days, KBS N Drama operated with 48 
programs, MBC Drama Net operated with 54 programs, and SBC Drama 
operated with 56 programs.  The number of each drama channel’s programs is 
considerably small, comparing with the two movies channels, but this does not 
mean that the drama channels did not have diversity in their programs.  Unlike 
the two movie channels in which a movie is referred to as a program, the three 
drama offered most of their programs classified as program types such as 
dramas, variety shows, situation comedies, etc, which consisted of a series of 
episodes other than one-time programs.  In this sense, the study examined the 
number of one-time programs and episodes of programs rather than the number 
of programs or program types.  If the study examines the number of programs or 
program types, the result might appear differently. 
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Table 4 presents the number of programs used by each drama channel, 
the number and proportion of each channel’s program and episode transmission, 
and the number and proportion of programs shared among the channels.  In so 
doing, the table also reports vertical program diversity and horizontal program 
diversity with regard to three drama channels.  KBS N Drama set up 1,970 slots 
in its 100-days programming schedule with 629 episodes from 48 programs.  Out 
of its 1,970 slots, KBS N Drama used 692 episodes of dramas, situation 
comedies, and variety shows to fill the same number of slots as the number of 
episodes.  KBS N Drama filled the remaining 1,278 slots by transmitting the 629 
episodes twice or more.  MBC Drama Net had offered 1,053 episodes from 54 
programs with 2,488 slots for 100 days, and it filled 1,435 slots by transmitting 
the 1,053 episodes twice or more.  SBS Plus used 684 episodes from 56 
programs in order to fill 1,863 slots in its 100-days programming schedule.  While 
684 episodes took charge of 684 slots of SBS Plus, it filled 1,179 slots by 
transmitting the 684 episodes twice or more. 
 
TABLE 4 – Vertical and horizontal program diversity in drama channels 
 KBS 
N Drama 
MBC 
Drama Net 
SBS 
Plus 
 
Total 
Number of programs 48 54 56 158 
(100%) 
Once 692 
(35.1%) 
1,053 
(42.3%) 
684 
(36.7%) 
2,429 
Twice 
or more 
1,278 
(64.9%) 
1,435 
(57.7) 
1,179 
(63.3%) 
3,892 
 
Number of 
transmission of 
episodes 
Total 1,970 
(100%) 
2,488 
(100%) 
1,863 
(100%) 
6,321 
(100%) 
Shared 
programs/episodes 
0 0 
(0%) 
1. Vertical diversity: shaded cells 
2. Horizontal diversity: bold italics 
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692 episodes which appeared once in KBS N Drama composed 35.1% of 
its 1,970 slots.  In other words, KBS N Drama operated in .351 degree of vertical 
program diversity.  MBC Drama Net’s 1,053 episodes took 43.3% in terms of the 
proportion of one-time transmission out of the total 2,488 slots in the channel.  
The proportion 43.8% represented .433 degree of vertical program diversity in 
MBC Drama Net.  SBS Plus came up with 36.7% in terms of one-time 
transmission out of 1,863 slots, which stood for .367 degree of vertical program 
diversity in SBS Plus.  There were no overlapped programs among three drama 
channels.  At this point, three drama channels operated in 1.0 degree of 
horizontal program diversity.  However, the result seems problematic.  If this 
study examined the number of program types, there would be many program 
types overlapped among the three channels, so the horizontal program diversity 
might appear relatively lower than current degree 1.0.  All three drama channels 
are subsidiaries of their parent broadcast companies, KBS, MBC, and SBS.  Also, 
subsidiaries of KBS, MBC, and SBS are program providers for the drama 
channels: KBS Media, MBC Production, and SBS Media Holdings.  Each 
program provider offers programs a drama channel only under its corporate 
umbrella, and the programs are mostly the ones that appeared or appear once in 
the parent company’s over-the-air broadcast channels.  At this point, a major 
operation of the three drama cable channels is retransmission of broadcasting 
programs (Calabrese & Wasko, 1992). 
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CONCLUSION 
This research paper has examined on the development of the Korean cable 
television system.  In so doing, the research paper took account for the relations 
between the government policies toward the South Korean cable television and 
changes within its industrial structure.  Then, the paper discussed three important 
issues raised by the introduction of cable television in South Korea: localism, 
competition, and diversity.  In the section on diversity especially, the research 
paper provided empirical findings in relation to vertical and horizontal diversity of 
programs in the South Korean cable television channels. 
A primary driver of cable television in South Korea was the government’s 
political interest rather than public and economic interest.  A former South 
Korean president Roh Tae-woo proposed a pledge during the 1987 presidential 
campaign that he would establish a new cable television system in order to 
provide a multichannel television environment for South Koreans, and he began 
to set up a plan for the new cable television system, GCT, to fulfill his pledge 
after he became president in 1988.  Ever since then, however, the South Korean 
cable television had been a hot issue for more than a decade in terms of policy-
making and stabilization of cable television. 
The South Korean government failed to stabilize the GCT in the initial 
phase due to lack of proper policies and lack of recognition of cable television as 
an industrial property.  What Roh government had done during his incumbency 
was just to add a new cable system GCT and a new law to an established cable 
system RCT controlled by an established law.  As a result, two cable television 
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systems had coexisted, controlled respectively by different regulatory bodies with 
different laws and competing with each other to survive in a single cable 
television market.  In addition, the South Korean government worried that the 
GCT would erode the duopoly system of public broadcasting companies.  
Accordingly, Roh government blocked the ways of any privately-owned company 
to become a big television conglomerate by prohibiting vertical and horizontal 
ownerships in the GCT, which made it hard for SOs and PPs to survive in 
competition with the RCT entrepreneurs and with the two public broadcasting 
companies. 
A couple of years later after its start, the GCT was estimated as a big 
failure.  Both the South Korean government and the GCT entrepreneurs lost a 
considerable amount of money.  In order to revive the GCT, the South Korean 
government began to deregulate the ownership limitation, amending the General 
Cable Television Law in 1998.  Furthermore, the South Korean government 
integrated three television-related laws into one compressive law, the Broadcast 
Law of 2000.  Since then, South Korean cable television has been stabilized and 
has thrived to the extent that the cable television now reaches 77.5% nationwide 
with more than 15 million subscribers. 
The introduction of GCT has important meanings in South Korean 
television industry.  The South Korean television mediascape started to be 
transformed since the introduction of GCT.  The GCT brought privatization in the 
South Korean television market where two public broadcasting companies had 
dominated under the duopoly system.  The GCT indicated South Korea entered 
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the age of multichannel and multimedia.  The introduction of GCT raised such 
important issues as localism, competition, and diversity of content and viewers’ 
choices. 
While thriving, South Korean cable television has also faced harsh 
competition with other TV media such as DBS, DMB, DMB, IPTV, and Wibro.  
Cable television in South Korea seems to be beating the competition, but 
whether or not it will still be a winner in the future is unknown.  The introduction of 
GCT was considered to be the beginning of localism in South Korean 
broadcasting system (Youn & Kim, 2006).  Unlike expectation, however, the GCT 
had rarely promoted localism (Lee & Joe, 2000; Youn, 1999) because a 
subscriber in a rural area enjoys the same channels and programs as a 
subscriber in the capital of South Korea, Seoul, regardless of whether or not a 
system operator for the rural subscriber is a local entrepreneur.  In terms of 
program diversity, this paper performed a small case study with five channels – 
two movie channels and three drama channels.  According to the findings of the 
study, each channel operated in certain degree of vertical diversity but did not so 
in a high degree though channels operated with high degree of horizontal 
diversity. 
With regard to localism and competition issues, this research paper lacks 
much explanation of what really happens in the South Korean cable television.  
Thus, another project could include an empirical study on those issues to show 
what really happens.  For the diversity issue, this research paper possesses at 
least two weak points.  A weakness of the report’s empirical study on program 
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diversity is that it cannot generalize the findings to the extent that all other cable 
channels operate in the similar degrees of diversity to the five chosen channels.  
Therefore, a paper needs to expand cases; for example, the number of channels 
of cable television, the program types of cable television and other television 
media, etc.  Another weakness is that the case study looks at only the program 
diversity among four types of diversity: viewpoint diversity, outlet diversity, source 
diversity, and program diversity.  For instance, the three drama channels seem to 
operate with vertical and horizontal diversity of programs, but the program 
diversity in those channels reflects neither true program diversity nor source 
diversity if compared with the parent companies of each channel.  Each drama 
channel transmits all the programs that appeared or appear once in its parent 
company’s over-the-air television channel(s).  Therefore, when all four diversity 
types are incorporated in a study, the study can fully explain true diversity in the 
South Korean cable television. 
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